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ABSTRACT
Beyond Phase I of Zimbabwe’s Land Reform and Resettlement Program (1980-1998) and fast track 
resettlement, the private land market has created an important process of shadow land reform and de 
facto land redistribution. However, legal constraints on subdivision and the high costs of subdividing and 
defining property rights on the ground are creating a legal limbo where the current owner is de facto 
subdividing property but the new claimants are unable to secure land rights or financial capital to aid in 
development. This paper analyzes the legal and institutional constraints to subdivision and consolidation, 
the financial and time constraints to subdivision, and the contribution of subdivisions and consolidations 
to the expansion and/or contraction in land supply. It also presents findings of current case study research 
contrasting subdivision constraints with de facto subdivision that is nonetheless occurring on the ground, 
and the detrimental effects informal subdivision is having on land use management and capital investment 
unless current policies are modified.
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1. INTRODUCTION
At the time of independence in 1980, Zimbabwe inherited a dual economy characterized by skewed land 
ownership and white minority control over the country’s land and water resources. For a decade following 
independence in 1980, the government of Zimbabwe made significant headway in redistributing land to 
the black majority population, but these efforts had substantially stalled by the mid-1980s. In 1998, the 
Government of Zimbabwe sought to reaccelerate the land reform and resettlement programme through a 
joint government-donor initiative that included a two-year implementation phase, and pilot experimentation 
with “improved government” and “new complementary” models of land reform and resettlement.
The redistributive land reforms implemented in Central America and Asia in the 1950s to the 1970s 
included coercive measures to redistribute land from landed elites to beneficiaries, including expropriations, 
land taxation, and limits on number and size of land holdings. The 1980s witnessed a global downsizing 
of land reform efforts and the beginning of the shift from redistributive land reform to market-assisted land 
reform (1990s) and presently to community-assisted land reform. The reasons for this policy shift are 
multiple and complex but a number of factors played a role: a) the after effects of the Arab Oil embargo in 
the late 1970s and a shift in policy focus to structural adjustment programmes to address macroeconomic 
imbalances: b) sagging support for land nationalizations in donor countries; and c) shrinking funds for 
state land acquisition and resettlement costs. In addition, according to Van den Brink (2002), redistributive 
reforms have proved bureaucratic, cumbersome, slow, and costly.
In contrast with state acquisition and state planned resettlement, community-driven or market-assisted 
land reform gives grants or subsidized loans to communities, groups, and individuals for land purchase or 
land development costs. In both instances of land acquisition and resettlement, land reform beneficiaries 
make greater use of private land markets to identify land for acquisition, and have greater ownership and 
choice in determining appropriate resettlement investments and land use planning. Even within market 
assisted approaches, however, there often remains the need for public provision of services that the 
private sector either does not provide or provides at a cost that exceeds the means of the poor to pay. 
Assistance may be needed by beneficiaries in negotiating the sales transaction, securing land rights, and 
planning land use and investment including the demarcation of towns and villages and improving access 
to electricity, schools, roads, water, sewage, and communicatiors
It is debatable whether the land market (even with facilitatin' , r\0 modest grant support) can adequately 
serve the needs of the poor through speedy land delivery. However, the purpose of this paper is to address 
a different but related question in Southern Africa. In instances where the land market can and should be 
used in place of or in tandem with government assisted land redistribution, is national policy on land 
markets and subdivision constraining the ability of the land market to deliver land to the poor?
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22. SUBDIVISION (THEORETICAL BENEFITS)
The issue of restrictive subdivision regulations is particularly important to the Southern African countries 
of Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, countries currently embarking on large scale land redistribution 
exercises. These countries are pursuing varying mixes of market-based as well as government assisted 
redistributive schemes to avail land to both resource poor landless and to enable blacks with some resources 
to enter commercial agriculture. In all countries however, the pace of market based approaches has been 
markedly slow and restrictive subdivision regulations have been identified as one of the major limitations. 
Of late, the rapid decline in agricultural production in Zimbabwe, coinciding with the fast track resettlement 
programme, has raised concern about productivity in redistributing subdivided land.
Subdivision is the process of dividing one parcel of land into two or more contiguous sub-parcels or 
stands. A number of stereotypical examples help illustrate how subdivision through community or market- 
assisted land reform facilitates land acquisition and resettlement (see Roth, 1993 for further elaboration 
on market-assisted land reform options). For example, the owner of a “large-farm" or estate might subdivide 
the parcel and allocate subdivided portions to his or her farmworkers for the establishment of residential 
stands or arable land for farming. The owner of the “large-farm” in exchange for tax deferments or relief 
of progressive land taxation might subdivide the land and sell-off underutilized land holdings to 
disadvantaged private investors or land reform beneficiaries with access to government grants. Individuals 
or groups in communal areas might negotiate with a potential land seller for a block (a subdivision) of land 
which is then sold to the community or further subdivided to individuals within the community. Or, a farm 
on the outskirt of a municipality might be subdivided into lots for urban real estate development or residential 
stands.
These and similar solutions that deliver land to the poor through market assisted mechanisms depend on 
“sellers” and “buyers" negotiating land transfers in the private land market with minimum government 
intervention in parcel or beneficiary selection, or scale of land acquisition or resettlement. As long as 
subdivision results in the transfer of land from "landed elites” to the poor, land redistribution by definition 
will in most cases enhance equity. Whether such land redistribution also improves efficiency or agricultural 
productivity is a separate question illustrated by the hypothetical graph in Figure 1. Consider the situation 
of a large farm, plantation or estate comprised of one or several parcels of land or farming units totaling M 
hectares in size. Curve ABC in Figure 1 depicts the long-run average costs of a firm exhibiting increasing 
returns to scale over farm size 0-m, and decreasing returns to scale over farm size mr M. Assume that 
land throughout the farm is of more or less homogenous quality and that farm size efficiency to the right of 
point m, or B declines due to labour and capital constraints that result in land under-utilization. Assume 
further that any portion of this farming unit (either one farm as a parcel or a portion of one farm) might be 
redistributed to “n” land reform beneficiaries with identical average costs (cr  c2or c3).
Under redistributive land reform, the government could designate one or more farms within the farming 
unit for redistribution, acquire these through expropriation or through “willmg-seller, willing-buyer” 
mechanisms, and redistribute the land to beneficiaries. Subdivision constraints need not apply if the state 
waives subdivision regulations for smallholder resettlement, or acquires a farm and settles the beneficiaries 
but does not legally demarcate the sub-parcels for the new beneficiary landowners.
Under market-assisted or community-assisted land reform, low-cost subdivision is crucial to the 
effectiveness of the land redistribution effort if the intent is to enable one or several beneficiaries to carve 
off a piece of an existing farm parcel for group or individual settlement. While government could waive or 
ease subdivision restrictions for private land market transactions that support land reform, governments 
in Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe have not shown a willingness to do so to date. The rationale for 
this reluctance is addressed shortly, but for the moment, subdivision of the large farm, plantation or estate 
into smaller subdivisions may offer land reform beneficiaries several hypothetical efficiency paths.
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Figure 1: Indicative long-run average cost curves
a) Exclusionary Growth Subdivision. The average costs of beneficiary (land reform) households (c3) 
exceed the average cost of the large farm enterprise over its domain OM (with exception of total costs 
Ac,a associated with farm size 0m2). While land reform may be justified for equity benefits, total costs of 
beneficiary land holdings exceed that of the large-scale farm by area aBC less Ac,a. Higher costs from 
smallholder agriculture might result from different technology, limited access to markets and credit, unskilled 
management, or land holdings too small in size.
b) Peripheral Growth Subdivision. Any reduction in average costs from c3 to for example c2 would 
enable efficiency gains by smallholder beneficiaries. All else constant, in Figure 1 aggregate efficiency 
would be improved by the large-farm estate downsizing to size 0m3 with area m3M redistributed to beneficiary 
households. Small parcels carved off from the large farm estate will tend to be dispersed and may be 
peripheral to the agricultural operations of the estate, but nonetheless benefit land reform through, for 
example, giving land ownership to workers of the farm estate. Growth is enhanced by lowering costs 
equivalent to area deC.
c) Growth Enhancing Subdivision. Average costs of beneficiary (land reform) households (c,) are 
equal to the average cost of the large-scale enterprise at point B on the average cost curve. Redistributing 
m, to M hectares to land reform beneficiaries would reduce total costs by area BCE. Any partial reduction 
in the size of the large farm enterprise from m, to 0 would maintain average costs of beneficiary holdings 
at c1 but drive up average costs of the remaining large-scale enterprise. Land reform might thus take two 
forms -  maintain the core estate at Om, and redistribute Om, to M to land reform beneficiaries; or redistribute 
the entire farm size to “n” land reform beneficiaries.
d) Integration Dependent (Core Estate + Smallholdings) Subdivision. A variant of growth enhanced 
subdivision above, the efficiency gains from subdivision are dependent on a core nuclear estate being 
maintained to reduce the average costs of land reform beneficiaries. Assume average costs of land 
reform beneficiaries are c2 using small farm based technology, but decline to c. when beneficiaries are 
able to take advantage of lower marketing costs of the core estate (achieved through economies of scale 
or improved management) or through improved access to technology, resources or economic opportunity. 
The core estate or remaining large farm enterprise benefits from secure labour supply and output contracts 
with farm workers or new land reform beneficiaries. Beneficiary households benefit from the marketing 
expertise and improved access to markets, technology, financial capital and high valued-added activities 
provided by the core estate. An internal division of land resources is achieved with area 0 to m, maintained 
by the core estate and m, to M redistributed to farmworkers, tenants or land reform beneficiaries.
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4In all four cases, subdivision and redistribution of land from the large-scale estate to land reform beneficiaries 
would be equity enhancing. With reduction of average costs of the n-beneficiary households initially from 
c to c2 partial subdivision of the farming unit from M to m, would result in efficiency gains. Further cost- 
reductions from c2 to c, would justify further land redistribution from m. to m2 and may easily justify total 
redistribution of m, to 0. There nonetheless remains the very important question whether land reform 
beneficiaries have the means or ability to engage in production at costs less than or at least comparable 
with the large-scale estate from which the land is being redistributed?
The classic inverse relationship between farm size and yield per hectare (Berry and Cline, 1979; Dyer, 
1997) is often invoked to support land redistribution (and one might add support for “Growth Enhancing 
Subdivision” above). Large farms experience greater difficulties in supervising wage labour to control 
absenteeism and labour shirking, while small farms directly reap the benefits of employing their own 
labour in the farming enterprise (Bhalla, 1979; Feder, 1985) .
However, the inverse size-productivity relationship is neither immutable nor universal (Ahmad and Quereshi,
1999). Costs or yields will not vary systematically with farming enterprises or farm size. Price distortions in 
factor (capital and land) and output markets can more than offset the labour advantage of small farmers, 
particularly if large farm estates are the beneficiaries of farm subsidies or state support. Small farmers 
often face higher transaction and transportation costs in accessing financial, input and output markets, 
and gaining access to knowledge and new technology, particularly in situations where markets are highly 
centralized and developed to serve large farm interests not a dispersed population of small farming units. 
Small farmers are further constrained in farming enterprises that require high levels of management 
(horticulture, flower growing) or vertical coordination between production and marketing (plantation crops) 
(Van den Brink, 2002).
Consequently, the global experience with smallholder productivity under land reform is mixed (El-Ghonemy, 
2002) with successes observed in Asia and stagnant to low smallholder productivity gains in Latin America 
(Thiesenhusen, 2002). Despite Zimbabwe’s maize revolution which demonstrated small farmer comparative 
advantage in maize production (Eicher and Rukuni, 1994; Roth and Bruce, 1994), other studies have 
shown muted productivity response by resettlement farmers (Bratton, 1990; Owens, Hoddinottand Kinsey, 
2001). According to Roth and Bruce (1994). resettled smallholder farmers have had to contend with 
limited farm management skills and experience, being given only temporary permits conferring land use 
rights, poor access to markets and extension advice, inadequate social cohesion (because settlers are 
taken from around the country), and government’s inability to fill the void of input distribution and marketing 
services that land reform has left void.
The problem with basing land reform arguments on the inverse size-productivity relationship is that it 
tends to aggregate all land available for redistribution regardless of land use, land quality, location, access, 
or management differences. Zimbabwe’s government since the early 1990s has favoured the acquisition 
and resettlement of large tracks of designated land to enable scale economies in the delivery of schools, 
clinics, roads and services. The problem inherent in this strategy, as demonstrated-in Figure 1, is that 
wholesale replacement of the large farm sector can result in efficiency losses as efficient large-scale 
farmers are displaced along with the inefficient ones. While the case for wholesale replacement is no 
doubt.warranted \r\ certain ertuattons, W. can a\so be argued that spinning ott portions of tarms fpenp'nevai 
growth subdivision or growth enhancing subdivision) or retaining the core estate while transferring a 
portion of the farm estate to farmworkers, tenants, or contract labourers (integration dependent subdivision) 
is also a win-win situation for beneficiaries, the large farm estate, and the nation. But such strategies 
require a land market policy that enables time responsive subdivision at low transaction costs.
3. LEGAL AND ECONOMIC VIABILITY CONSTRAINTS ON 
SUBDIVISION IN ZIMBABWE
a) Prevailing Legal and Regulatory Framework
The Zimbabwe Regional Town and Country Planning Act 1976, Chapter 29:12 (Part VI) governs the 
subdivision and consolidation of any property. In terms of Section 39 of the Regional Town and Country 
Planning Act, the subdivision of land held under title into two or more properties requires a subdivision 
permit granted in terms of Section 40 (see Box 1). Such permit is required for any subdivision of the
cEfirme ^or ‘applied social sciences
5
“TO*. • .•
parcel, change of ownership on any portion of the parcel, or granting of leases or rights of occupancy 10 
years or longer in duration.1 Property held in undivided shares is exempt from the permit/
Box 1: Application for (subdivision) permit
1. Permit Application. The landowner or legal representative must submit an application for subdivision 
according to the local planning authority in terms of Section 40 of the Act. A complete application 
entails: a) a TPSC 1 form; b) certified copies of the Title Deed to the property being subdivided; c) 1 
Sepia copy and 18 copies of drawings of the proposed subdivision; d) letter of representation; and e) 
application fees. Such application should be accompanied by the consent in writing of the owner of 
the property, every holder of a mortgage bond registered over the property, and if required by the 
local authority, the consent in writing of the holder of any other real right registered over the property.
2. Acknowledgement. Once an application is deemed “complete” or satisfactory by the local planning 
authority, it must acknowledge receipt of the application within two weeks according to Section 40 
(2) Paragraph A.3
3. Notification. In accordance with Subsection 3, the local authority shall require the applicant at his or 
her own expense to give public notice of the application, and to serve notice (and submit proof that 
notice is given) of the application to every owner of property adjacent to the parcel to be subdivided, 
and other owners advised by the local planning authority in cases where the proposal:
• Conflicts with any condition registered against the title deed of the property concerned and which 
confers a right that may be enforced by the owner of another property;
• Proposes any use which in terms of the operative master plan, local plan, or approved scheme 
may only be granted by the local planning authority; or,
• Proposes any use or subdivision in an area for which there is no operative master plan, local 
plan, or approved scheme and the land use is materially different from, or the size of any proposed 
subdivision for residential purposes is smaller than, the land use or size of residential properties.
4. Consultation. In accordance with Section 40 (4) Paragraph b, consultations with other ministries 
and government departments may be undertaken to ascertain the suitability of the proposed 
subdivision.
5. Objections and Representations. Any objections or representations in connection with notification 
must be received within one month of the date of public notice of the application, or from the ministers 
responsible for roads and aviation. The local planning authority shall advise the applicant of the 
nature of any objections and provide time for the applicant to submit comments before the application 
is decided upon.
6. Granting of Permit. (Section 40 (5)). The local planning authority may after objections or 
representations grant a permit subject to the relevant regional plan, master plan, local plan, or 
approved scheme provided that approval of the minister responsible for agriculture is obtained for 
land outside the jurisdiction of a municipal council or town council. In addition, any permit authorizing 
the subdivision of any property shall require that the survey records concerned be submitted to the 
Surveyor General (as required in the Land Survey Act).
7. Refusal and Right of Appeal. In the event a permit for subdivision is refused, the local planning 
authority must provide reasons in writing for the refusal. If the local planning authority has not decided 
upon the subdivision application within 4 months of the date of acknowledgement of receipt of 
application, or by the date of any extension of that period granted the applicant in writing, the application 
is deemed refused by the planning authority The applicant has right of appeal (Section 44) to the 
Administrative Court.
'According to Section 39, no person shall consolidate two or more properties into one property, or subdivide any
property or enter any agreement except in accordance with a permit granted in terms of Section 40. including:
• change of ownership of any portion of the property:
• lease of any portion of the property for a period of 10 years or more or for the lifetime of the lessee;
• conferring on any person a right to occupy any portion of a property for a period of 10 years or more for his 
lifetime, or;
• renewal of the lease of, or right to occupy any portion of. a props i iy where the aggregate period of the lease or 
right to occupy, including the period of renewal, is 10 years or more.
2 There are other exemptions as well:
• land within the jurisdiction of (and owned by) a municipal council or town council:
• land within a local government area administered by a local authority which is owned by that authority or by the 
state;
• leases ornghts to occupy any building or portion thereof where the occupation is consistent with operative 
master plans or local plans, or any condition registered against the title; and
• land which is alienated by the State, or land which falls within the jurisdiction of a municipality or town that is to 
be consolidated with other land.
3 Applications for subdivision of any land adjacent to any state road or obstacle limitation area of an aerodrome
must also be forwarded to the ministers responsible for roads and aviation for advisement.
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6In urban areas, the local authority -  city, municipality or town council -  reviews such applications and 
makes final decisions. For rural areas, the Department of Physical Planning processes the application on 
behalf of the Minister of Local Government and National Housing. If the subdivided property is to be used 
for agricultural purposes or a feedlot, the permit requires, in addition, an assessment of economic viability 
by the Ministry of Agriculture, Lands and Rural Resettlement through the Department of Agricultural 
Technical and Extension Services (Agritex).4 These procedures operate in conjunction with the provision 
of relevant Outline Plans or Master Plans, and Town Planning Schemes or Local Plans.5
Once the application is submitted, the local planning authority will seek, in writing, consent of holders with 
vested legal rights in land such as mortgages and will review the business plan proposed for the 
subdivision(s) and the remainder of the parcel. For both rural and urban land, the local authority scrutinizes 
the planning application for road access; availability of water for primary use; concern about “ad-hoc” 
subdivision; need for the subdivision or separate title; standard size of properties in the area; electricity; 
telecommunications; provisions of a relevant statutory plan; social facilities, schools, and clinics; agricultural 
viability; and water for irrigation/horticulture.
Provision of electricity, roads, telephone6 and water are not always critical factors in approval as these 
can be made available, funds permitting.7 The need for subdivision for schools, churches and clinics is 
also seldom a problem. Concerns relating to ad-hoc subdivision, however, are contentious due to lack of 
a clear definition of what is "ad hoc”. Operative Town Planning Schemes are binding and have “tour de 
force" no matter how outdated the scheme may be.8 As noted in Box 2, various agencies or departments 
may be consulted in this process.
Box 2: Agencies or departments potentially involved in the subdivision process
1. Department of Agricultural Technical and Extension Services (AGRITEX) advises on the 
economic viability of the proposed subdivisions for agricultural purposes or a feedlot. A permit 
requires the approval of the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement.
2. Department of Physical Planning. In cases where the application creates more than five new 
subdivisions, the Provincial Planning Officer needs to be consulted. The Director compiles overall 
recommendations to be submitted to the National Subdivision Committee.
3. Mines and Minerals Act. Any parcel greater than 100 hectares in size to be subdivided requires 
a certificate from the Commissioner of Land.
4. Surveyor General. Reviews surveying diagrams or the general plan.
5. Registrar of Deeds, Advises on title.
6. Registrar of Administrative Court. Advises on conditions of registered water rights or permits.
7. Provincial Water Engineer. Comments on availability and adequacy of water supplies.
8. Chief Hydrological Engineer. Comments on underground water resource availability.
9. Provincial Roads Engineer. Comments on any subdivision adjacent to a state road.
10. Provincial Natural Resources Officer. Comments on natural resources and environment.
11. Rural District Council. Advises on property in conjunction with local development plans.
12. Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority. Advises how proposals might affect power lines.
13 Ministry of Transport and Communication. Advisement is required if the application relates to 
any property adjacent to a state road or within obstacle limitations of an aerodrome.
4Rural agricultural land is defined in the Act as: “property outside the., .jurisdiction of a municipal council or town 
which is used or to be used for agricultural purposes or feedlot. '
5Whereas outline plans are. in the main, more than twenty-five years old and have largely been replaced by more 
recent plans, one cannot say the same about rural town planning schemes that have remained in use. 
Regrettably, case law has ruled that provisions of Town Planning Schemes may not be overruled by new Master 
plan provisions but that Local Plans may replace old Town Planning Schemes.
bThe importance of telecommunications is receding with the expansion of cellular networks.
7While not critical, both the Posts and Telecommunication Corporation (PTC) and Zimbabwe Electricity Supply 
Authority (ZESA) are regularly consulted on subdivisions to assist them with planning and managing their 
respective telephone and electrical networks. Subdivision proposals generally mean additional revenue to which 
they seldom object.
sThis problem is exacerbated by lack of capacity and wherewithal to replace outdated Town Planning Schemes 
with Local Plans.
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All comments are to be submitted to the Department of Physical Planning within six weeks of the request 
being received by the appropriate department or ministry, which forwards the recommendations to the 
National Subdivision Committee.9 In most cases the subdivision of land from the date of application to the 
granting of a permit should not exceed four months. In the case where an applicant makes an application 
and it is not acknowledged within four months, the application is considered "refused" by the Local Planning 
Authority.
Whereas the provisions of the relevant Town Planning Scheme are critical, there are other important 
considerations based on case law. The principle of res judicata prevents a subdivision proposal that is 
materially the same as an application previously rejected from being resubmitted. Proposals consistent 
with “more desirable land ownership” and “special circumstance” based on well articulated policy positions 
(e.g. indigenization and resettlement) could invoke approval from planning authorities. There is another 
common subdivision request -  subdividing property split or severed by a road or railway. However the 
courts have repeatedly stated that severance cannot be used as a basis for subdivision because of the 
precedent this would set for thousands of similarly affected properties. Finally, many subdivision proposals 
are motivated by financial difficulties to dispose of property or to subdivide land for inheritance purposes. 
Unfortunately, neither Town Planning principles nor case law are sympathetic to these justifications.10 The 
result on the ground is a proliferation of land held in undivided shares, joint ownership, and de facto 
subdivisions.
b) Other Relevant Statutes
According to Section 53 of Zimbabwe's Water Act of 1998, whenever a parcel of land to which a water 
permit has been granted is to be subdivided, the current owner must lodge an application for the 
apportionment or revision of the water permit. The Land Survey Act, Part VII, Section 40 states that there 
will be no registration without the Surveyor General's approval. Section 42 of the Land Survey Act requires 
the landowner, excluding the State and Land Planning Authority, to instruct a land surveyor to prepare the 
consolidated title diagram in conformity with the Regional. Town and Country Planning Act. Responsibilities 
of the Surveyor General begin once his office is notified of approval. Time is required for the plot(s) to be 
surveyed by a registered Land Surveyor and for a survey diagram to be submitted for checking and 
recording.
The Deeds Registry Act, Section 21 stipulates that no portion of any land shall be transferred without a 
survey diagram being attached. Once the Surveyor General is satisfied, he/she advises the Register of 
Deeds who would provide the title deeds to the separate properties surveyed within six months of approval.
c) Minimum and Maximum Land (Farm) Size Constraints
Subdivision policy enforces minimum land size holdings for urban11, peri-urban, and rural land consistent 
with prevailing land use criteria. The minimum subdivision area for peri-urban properties is 0.4 to 0.8 ha 
for residential use and 2 to 3 ha for agricultural plots depending on soil type, geology, and availability of 
adequate water (see Appendix for variants to these norms).12 For land outside a municipal or town council 
used for agricultural purposes or a feedlot, minimum land size subdivision constraints are imposed indirectly
9 The National Subdivision Committee normally meets once a month under the chairmanship of the Ministry of 
Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. The National Committee comprises the following membership: 
Ministry of Lands Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, Department of Agricultural and Extension Services 
(Agritex), Department of Physical Planning, Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU). Commercial Farmers Union 
(CFU), Indigenous Commercial Farmers Union (ICFU), Department of Natural Resources, and the Civil Division 
of the Attorney General's Office.
10 Refusals of these applications are unpopular with property owners and have given rise to statements that 
subdivision policy is “colonial", “outdated", “foreign” and “racist” in origin.
’’ Section 8 of the Regional. Town and Country Planning Regulations. 1976 sets the minimum area of 
subdivisions for residential use. The minimum subdivision for the erection of a single family detached dwelling 
or the land on which such a dwelling is situated shall be 4 000 m2 if a water source approved by the Local 
Planning Authority will be available, or 2 000 m2 if the applicant proposes the subdivision of an area of not less 
than five hectares within the jurisdiction of a municipal council, and a reticulated water supply and septic tank 
(with adequate sanitation) will be available.
12 The boundaries of peri-urban areas are defined by: i) Master Plan boundaries, for example in Bulawayo,
Kadoma and Harare: ii) 5 km distance from existing municipal boundaries where no master plans are in place; 
and Hi) all townships outside the 5 km distance and outside areas defined by master plans.
7 ..
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8through economic viability requirements. Each subdivision proposal is subjected to an agricultural viability 
assessment including yield or output from the proposed subdivision and earnings using the prevailing 
farming system norms appropriate to the agro-ecological region.
Maximum land size constraints also apply. The Rural Land (Farm Sizes) Regulations 1999 place ceilings 
on farm sizes according to Natural Region (NR): NR I - 250 ha, NR lla - 350 ha, NR lib - 400 ha, NR III - 
500 ha, NR IV - 1 500 ha, and NR V -  2 000 ha. Any person or company who, immediately before the date 
of commencement of these regulations, owned a farm which exceeds the maximum size may continue to 
own that farm, but it shall not be sold, transferred or disposed of unless it has been subdivided into plots 
conforming to the maximum size regulations. Due to recent widespread designation of large-scale 
commercial farms, few applications have come in to enable one to test the comparability between agricultural 
viability requirements and the maximum farm size regulations.
d) Economic Viability Assessment
Two aspects of land use planning are considered when assessing subdivision applications, namely: planning 
considerations (e.g. access to roads, water, electricity, and size of property relative to size of adjacent 
properties); and agricultural viability, in particular profitability and food security.
Based on interviews with officers involved in the adjudication of subdivision applications, planning issues 
can be dealt with quickly by reviewing the application and making a site visit if necessary. It is more difficult 
to determine agricultural viability. The Government’s current policy for subdivision within the Small (SSCF) 
and Large Scale Commercial Farming (LSCF) sectors is to ensure that all subdivisions are viable based 
on general farming systems of the area. Subdivision assessments are based on the potential viability of 
the land or land use. and not the ability of the individual owner or landholder. Potential viability is calculated 
on the assumption of an average investment infrastructure and availability of mechanical equipment and 
tools. A viable farm is defined as one capable of providing a net income equivalent to the salary of a 
middle manager in the financial and industrial sectors of the economy applicable at the time of the subdivision 
assessment. The current (2002) net farm income threshold is about ZS1.2 million (or approximately 
US$22,000 at the official exchange rate of 55 to the US dollar) for large-scale commercial farming areas 
(Agritex, personal communication), and 20 percent of this figure for SSCF areas and formerly freehold 
and leasehold sectors reserved for black commercial farmers.
Pegging target farm incomes to those of relatively affluent skilled workers in the industrial sector that 
occupy less than 1 percent of formally employed Zimbabweans sets a very high crossbar for profitability 
Meeting such a threshold effectively pre-selects farmers/landowners with means and ability to operate 
larger holdings, and precludes many lower income households who lack such means (at least without 
substantial public grants or assistance). It further ignores cost of living differentials between urban and 
rural areas and fails to adjust rural income needs for non-monetary benefits (e.g. autoconsumption) that 
evade measurement in national income accounts. As a result, farm sizes tend to be significantly larger 
than their communal area counterparts in order to spread fixed costs or to accumulate sufficient per- 
hectare earnings over a larger land base. These thresholds further ignore off-farm earnings and the 
benefits of part-time farming that have become the norm worldwide.'1 Furthermore, using a lower profit 
threshold for the mainly “black” SSCF sector merely perpetuates unequal land distribution between “white” 
and “black" commercial farming areas. Demonstrating how unrealistic these thresholds are, Chasi et al. 
(1994) showed that in 1993 only 22 percent of the then existing 8,000 SSCF sector farms met the 
government stipulated profit criteria.
Also problematic is the notion that farms can be neatly clustered based on the “general farming systems” 
of the area and that Government can assess the economic potential of land without carefully considering 
individuals and their resourcefulness. Forcing all farmers to work identical areas of land, whatever their 
levels of skill, or means, risks severe wastage of scarce management resources and land/labour and 
land/capital ratios that are asynchronous with intrinsic resource scarcity. As noted by John Robertson
'-Given the tight credit conditions prevailing in Zimbabwe, part-time farming has become the only practical way of 
ensuring the ability to buy farm inputs through substitution of off-farm earnings for credit.
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(cited in KPMG/GoZ, 2000), “A skilled strawberry grower with sufficient capital could successfully produce 
many tons of berries from 10 hectares in the Plumtree area, but a cattle producer in the same area might 
need 15 hectares for every animal.”
Technocrats in the organizations managing land subdivisions tend to attribute the conservatism within 
Government and Agritex in creating small farms to the desire to safeguard food security. This argument is 
underscored implicitly by the belief that large scale farming (on a per hectare basis) is more productive 
than small scale farming. However, recent evidence shows that the communal sector produces nearly 
three times more maize, ten times more sorghum, and two and halftimes more cotton than the commercial 
farming areas (Ministry of Lands, Statistical Bulletin, 2000). Despite the existence of farm consolidation 
legislation, some technocrats within government believe that once land is subdivided it is difficult to ‘undo’ 
the subdivision. In principle, application for consolidation of contiguous properties for agricultural purposes 
is processed in the same manner as land subdivision. According to Chasi etal. (1994), such applications 
for land consolidation are rarely opposed on grounds of agricultural viability.
To compound the above philosophical problems with viability assessment, the implementation of 
administrative procedures to process subdivision applications are slowed by lack of resources. Agritex 
cites lack of personnel as part of their problem in speeding viability assessments. They lack expertise in 
some specialized types of farming (horticulture, wildlife, etc.) and often need to refer decisions back to the 
Agritex head office. In addition, due to budgetary constraints, staff is frequently unable to travel, and have 
to rely on subdivision applicants to come and collect them for site visits, creating the perception of lack of 
independence in decision making.
e) Problems of Administration
Transaction costs involved in administering subdivision policy present at times insurmountable hurdles, 
certainly for the land seller and buyer but perhaps as well for the implementing agencies involved, as 
follows:
i) Costs. The applicant is responsible for paying not only the application fees but also a percentage of the 
value of the stand as recompense for services used'4; applications with commercial and industrial uses 
stipulated incur a fee amounting to 12 percent of the value of the stand, and 7-10 percent for residential 
uses. Most of the services required for the application/permit -  surveying and registration fees -  also 
require payment by the applicant before a certificate of compliance is issued. In instances where the 
subdivision application is rejected and the applicant appeals, legal fees will be required.
ii) Getting a Foot in the Door. An application cannot be processed until it is complete, and a completed 
application requires time, costs, and know-how that disadvantage all but the initiated. The subdivision 
request is held or never processed waiting for a completed application.
Hi) Waiting for Approval. Approvals and evaluations required from multiple departments, agencies and 
ministries delay processing to the speed of the slowest common agent. The National Subdivision Committee 
in waiting for comments fails to make appropriate recommendations for the issuance or refusal of a 
subdivision permit within the application period, or within the extension granted, resulting in protracted 
delays.
iv) Subdivide First, Seek Approvals Later. Applicants’ exchange or sell land subdivisions before applying 
or receiving a subdivision permit placing infrastructural investments at risk. Applicants engage in strong 
lobbying attempts to compel office bearers to endorse their applications, against a rigid planning 
infrastructure that is not kindly disposed to unplanned initiatives.
uSince a local authority may object to a subdivision on the basis it imposes undue strain on its provision of 
services, it has become standard for developers to grant to the authority a payment to mitigate the effects of 
new developments.
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v) Non-Viable Stands. Most subdivision applications in peri-urban areas are either for land speculation 
or for payment of loans to financial institutions. The application is filed for agricultural purposes when the 
intended use is for residential or commercial use since change of use applications are more difficult to 
justify.
vi) Cash Flow and Moral Hazard. In cases where proposed land uses are novel, current subdivision 
policy requires that infrastructure development in proposals be put in place and a trial period under 
conditional permit be implemented until the applicant proves beyond reasonable doubt that the intended 
production is viable. In terms of underground water potential, borehole yield certificates are required 
before appropriate recommendations can be made. Investments (proposed in the subdivision application) 
must be made prior to the subdivision being approved. Many peri-urban subdivision proposals are 
considered non-viable in terms of general agricultural viability.15 The insistence on the installation of 
infrastructure and a viability track-record creates the proverbial "chicken and egg” situation for first time 
farmers by requiring considerable funds spent on investment without a guarantee of the permit being 
granted.
vii) Subdivisions Unjustified. Subdivisions are rejected because financial and family considerations do 
not justify subdivision, or the proposed land use according to government is not economically justifiable.
viii) Sluggish Information. The current information flow from one department to the other is slow since 
all stakeholder comments must be submitted to the Provincial Planning Officer of the Department of 
Physical Planning who in turn must compile a summary recommendation for the Physical Planning Director.
There is widespread recognition that subdivision regulations are too restrictive. In recent judgements, the 
Administrative Court has described the current subdivision policy and criteria as “too rigid” and has advised 
greater flexibility in assessing subdivision proposals. The Land Tenure Commission of Inquiry Into 
Appropriate Land Tenure Systems in Zimbabwe (GoZ, 1994) recognized the underutilization of land in the 
LSCF sector and recommended smaller commercial farms by relaxing subdivision restrictions. The 
Department of Physical Planning (1997) advised the subdivision of commercial farms between 3,000 and 
20,000 hectares in size and the expansion of small holdings in peri-urban areas whose population would 
grow from 350,000 to 3.5 million. While the Rural Land (Farm Sizes) Amendment Regulations (1999 and 
2000) further lowered these land size ceilings, there nonetheless is lack of practical reasoning for the 
chasm that separates small and large size farms in Zimbabwe.
The Draft National Land Policy Framework Document (1998) further underscores the rigidity of subdivision 
policy:
"...the classification of land according to agro-ecological potential has been fundamental to rural land use 
planning and regulation. ...This planning approach has been used to prescribe rigid land use and sub­
division controls, which undermine dynamic land use changes. ” (p. 19)
The Draft National Land Policy Framework Document (1998) further laments the conflictual relations 
inherent in the current subdivision policy:
“ The sources of statutory land use planning and regulation are poorly coordinated and conflictual as they 
originate from a multiplicity of sources. Such regulations are implemented by numerous authorities with 
scattered responsibilities and conflicting powers located in both central and local government. Most land 
use regulation is prescribed by central government with little regard to reality and actual land use practice." 
(P-21)
And with regard to peri-urban areas:
" The existing regulatory framework of operative town planning schemes coupled with subdivision and 
consolidation permits is proving incapable of meeting legitimate needs and changing economies. The 
planning schemes are out-of-date and subdivision policies [are] rigid, inefficient and inequitable. The 
subdivision approaches require drastic overhaul in favour of greater flexibility, decentralization and 
community involvement." (p. 24)
15lnltially, there was Insistence that a proposed horticultural activity should be proved agriculturally viable before 
a subdivision permit could be granted.
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The draft National Land Policy Framework concludes with two key recommendations. First, the process 
of land redistribution should be used as an opportunity to promote equitable access by smallholders to 
high quality land, irrigation and other infrastructural facilities and services, certainly not work against 
them. Second, the process of subdivision should be facilitated by (a) total deregulation (leave it to the 
market); (b) partial deregulation (e.g. subdivision is changed to accept smaller farm sizes as viable; or (c) 
dynamic deregulation under which the a national land board prescribes tri-annually reviewed changes of 
maximum and minimum farm sizes.
4. SUBDIVISION AND CONSOLIDATION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND 
IN PRACTICE
a) Subdivision/Consolidation and Delivery of Land
One effect of subdivision regulations has been discouragement of applications by farmers wishing to 
subdivide their land. According to public records, only 310 agricultural applications for land subdivision 
and consolidation were processed nationally between 1989 and 2000 although the rate of growth has 
increased in the last decade. The number of applications has increased from an average of 10 applications 
per year between 1990-94 to a peak of over 55 in 1998 (Figure 2). Accompanying this growth has been a 
growing number of subdivision proposals in peri-urban areas, particularly involving plot sizes less than 
250 hectares (Figure 3).
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Figure 2: Subdivision applications, 1989-2000
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Figure 3: Size Distribution of subdivision applications, 1989-2000
CENTRE FOR APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCES
12
Table 1 also shows that the majority of applications came from farmers in rural areas of Mashonaland 
East and Matebeleland North which surround the major cities of Harare and Bulawayo, respectively.
Table 1: Distribution of subdivision and consolidation applications by province, 1989-2000
Province Subdivision and Consolidation Applications
Mashonaland East 115
Mashonaland West 53
Mashonaland Central 27
Masvingo 14
Matebeleland North 53
Matebeleland South 27
Midlands 33
Manicaland 36
TOTAL 358
This trend has been partially motivated by the boom in the horticultural industry and the demand for 
smallholdings as a status symbol wrote the Director of Physical Planning as far back as 1990. However, 
since 1998, the number of applications has declined due to disruptions in the farm economy and in the 
delivery of land administration services that has accompanied government's expropriation of land from 
the commercial sector.
Despite the long-term upward trend in subdivision applications, the success rate in approvals has been 
very poor. Over the period 1989 to 2000, a total of 358 subdivision and consolidation applications were 
processed of which 310 were subdivision applications. Of these 310 applications, only 27 percent of the 
applications were approved (and even fewer may have eventually been subdivided due to the inability of 
land sellers to survey properties or meet requirements for land improvements) (Figure 4).
Percent
Figure 4: Success rate in subdivisions and consolidation: 1990-2000
The results of the adjudication process for applications show substantial bias towards consolidation to 
maintain large farm sizes, and a bias against subdivisions that reduce farm sizes below 400 hectares. 
The main reason given for rejection is agricultural viability. In a sub-sample of applications from Mashonaland 
East Province over the period 1990-2000. the National Subdivision Committee concurred with the decision 
of the Agritex Planning Branch in all 29 cases.
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According to statutes regulating land subdivisions, the time from submission of an application to granting 
of a permit should be about four months. In the sample of 29 applications in Mashonaland East province,' 
only 7 were concluded within this period The average period, from receipt of application, to .the'National 
Subdivision Committee meeting making the determination, was estimated to be nearly 7 months with a 
maximum time of nearly 13 months. The net result of these delays, combined with "ease” of consolidation, 
has been a loss in the supply of farmland for redistribution. Table 2 estimates the new farms created, and 
the potential new farms that could have been created, by legal subdivisions. The total applications (i.e. 
310) submitted during the 1989-2000 period had proposed creating 2 022 new farms
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Table 2: Effect of restrictive subdivision regulations on supply of farms: 1989-2000
Maximum Subdivision 
Plot Size(ha)
No. of Subdivision 
Applications
Potential Farms Created 
Had All Applications Been 
Approved3
Farms Actually 
Created
<250 152 1495 113
250-400 26 58 10
400-1000 60 265 48
1000-2000 42 95 40
>2000 30 109 43
Total 310 2,022 254
aNew farms proposed in all applications including those approved and rejected.
However, only 84 applications covering 254 new farms were actually approved. The number of approved 
consolidations over the same period (Table 3) led to a reduction in the number of new farms by 27 such 
that only a net of 227 farms was actually created.
Table 3: Loss of farms due to consolidations: 1990-2000
Province Consohdat n Successful Loss m Nm er of Farms3
Applications Applications
Mashonaland East 12 5 7
Mashonaland West 1 0 /i
Mashonaland Central 4 2 j
Masvingo 2 1 i
Matebeleland North 9 7 ii
Matebeleland South 8 1 i
Midlands 10 6 6
Manicaland 2 0 0 .
TOTAL 48 22 27
a Refers to the total number of farms absorbed in successful consolidations less the number of successful 
applications.
A total of 226 subdivision applications covering 1 768 farms and an area of 322 000 hectares were 
rejected. Thus, starting with 2 022 farms that could have been created, the land administration bureaucracy 
managed to deliver only 227 new farms over the 11-year period.
b) Subdivisions and Farm Structure
A central hypothesis in this paper is that too much friction in k/- eummc-n u l urn. subdivisions
has constrained the transfer of land to blacks n -r; w ••••;• ■>, i.w w.jyh pm-a a land maikets lo examine this 
hypothesis, evidence is reviewed of large-some cmwnerciai faim size and ownership yielded by land 
policy during the period up to 2000 when government embarked on “fast track” land reform The regulatory 
environment has done little to broaden access to land by blacks and women. Since independence in 1980 
only 1,063 blacks on 1,186 farms have managed to enter large-scale commercial farming through open 
market access such that, by the year 2000. this group of blacks constituted just 35 percent of farmers in 
the sector (Figure 5). And, by 2000 only 5 percent of large-scale commercial farms were owned by 
women (Figure 6).
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Figure 5: Racial composition of large scale 
commercial farms, 2000
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Figure 6: Gender distribution of individual 
large scale commercial farm owners, 2000
How could liberalization of subdivision have helped? The short answer is “a lot.” A review of the types of 
farms taken up by black farmers reveals a greater preference for small farm sizes (Figure 7). Table 4 
shows that in 2000 29 percent of black farms were in the range 0-100 hectares, 46 percent below 200 
hectares, 59 percent below 400 hectares, and 66 percent below 500 hectares. Subdivision regulations 
have not helped the creation of farms with plot sizes below 500 hectares, the size of farms preferred by 
black farmers. As observed in Figure 4, the success rate of applications requesting plot sizes below 400 
hectares was 20 percent, while those requesting sizes below 250 hectares was 10 percent.
Size Distribution of Black Owned LSCFs: 2000
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Figure 7: Size distribution of black owned LSCFs, 2000.
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Table 4: Size Distribution of black owned farms, 2000
Distribution
Size Category (ha) Percent of Farms3 Cumulative Distribution
0-100 29 29
100-200 17 46
200-300 8 53
300-400 6 59
400-500 7 66
500-600 5 71
600-700 4 75
700-800 3 77
800-900 4 82
900-1000 2 83
1000+ 17 100
aBased on the number of 1 186 “black" farms created in the LSCF sector between 1980 and 2000.
As of 2000, Zimbabwe’s LSCF sector was highly concentrated with the greater portion of land in relatively 
large holdings (greater than 500 hectares) run by few individual farmers and corporations. Review of the 
Central Statistical Office (CSO) databases on the LSCF sector show that as of 2000, 54 percent of farms 
were owned by individuals, 44 percent by corporations, 1 percent by NGO's and churches, and the remaining 
1 percent by various other forms of ownership including trusts. As indicated by Table 5, 50.0 percent of 
LSCF had farm sizes greater than 500 hectares However, this statistic hides the fact that most of the land 
area is highly concentrated in farms that are very large -  72 percent is located on farms greater than 
1,000 hectares in size, 82 percent on farms greater than 750 hectares, and 90 percent on farms greater 
than 500 hectares. The high concentration of land ownership is exacerbated by a high degree of multiple 
farm ownership. Just prior to “fast track’’, only 41 percent of the farms were being operated as single 
farms, 22 percent as two-farm operations, and 37 percent included between 3 and 29 farming units 16
Table 5: Size distribution of LSCFs by province, 2000
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>10000 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 1.1 1.9 0.6 7.0 0.9
5000-10000 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.7 0.6 2.0 1.9 5.6 1.1
2000-5000 3.3 5.0 2.6 4.9 6.7 13.8 6.4 8.7 5.9
1500-2000 3.0 5.6 1.9 3.4 2.6 5.2 5.6 6.1 3.9
1000-1500 11.0 16.8 11.8 19.3 7.3 14.1 13.3 9.2 13.6
750-1000 8.4 13.4 9.7 15 3 8.0 8.5 10.4 18.7 11.3
500-750 10.0 14.5 18.4 20.2 9.9 7.9 9.7 8.1 13.3
250-500 15.6 16.9 21.2 23.2 11.5 15.2 12.7 8.1 16.9
150-250 13.0 4.7 7.3 4.1 6.1 6.9 6.3 10.6 7.1
0-150 34.9 22.6 27.1 9.0 46.2 24 6 33.1 17.9 25.9
Total Farms 901 620 975 1,205 537 6SG 890 358 6,182
16 Registered lease under the Rural, Town and Country Planning Act(1976)
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Further analysis of CSO data show very little registered leasing activity to complement open market land 
transfers. The histories of registered CSO farms indicates only 90 have been leased since the 1960s. Of 
these 42 were being legally16 leased in the year 2000.
c) Informal Subdivisions and Security of Tenure
Beyond slowing the rate of land subdivisions, the legal and regulatory environment governing land 
subdivisions and problems with administrative implementation have encouraged the creation of new tenure 
forms supporting informal de facto subdivisions. The block share scheme is one type of informal subdivision 
found in Zimbabwe near urban and peri-urban areas. Six block share properties in the vicinity of Chegutu 
have been created during the past few years including Sable, Bushy Park, Tetbury, Chigwell Extension, 
Kwabino and Drummond farms. Other variants of the scheme are found around Goromonzi, Marondera, 
Mutare and Nyanga areas.
Most block share schemes were started by black indigenous farmers seeking to acquire property near 
towns and cities for the purpose of subdividing land into smaller agricultural stands for subsequent resell. 
Very few if any of the farmers claimed knowledge of land use regulations prevailing in Master Plans or the 
Town and Country Planning Act. Most said they had assumed that since these properties were close to 
urban areas, they could be subdivided and sold as peri-urban plots for agricultural use. For the properties 
located near Chegutu, some of the farmers acquired land through the Commercial Farm Settlement 
Scheme while others acquired land through sales transactions. Nearly all the farmers admitted having 
difficulty obtaining subdivision permits from the Department of Physical Planning (on grounds that the 
units were not viable or lacked infrastructure, e.g. boreholes, to enable intensive commercial farming).
The first scheme in the Chegutu area was implemented on the “Remainder of Kalembo of Chigwell 
Extension of Railway Farm No. 14” and Kwabino farms in September 2000 (Box 3). The properties lie in 
Agroecological Region lib, a high potential area suitable for intensive crop and livestock production. 
However, the area is vulnerable to severe dry spells and short rainy seasons.
The scheme is administered as a company registered under the Companies’ Act. Each member upon 
completing the purchase price and fulfilling conditions of the contract is entitled to a share certificate and 
becomes a shareholder in the land holding company, but the controlling shares remain with the scheme 
developer. Lease regulations do not apply as the new member is not leasing property. As most of the 
scheme developers have not yet applied for subdivision permits, these de facto subdivisions have not 
been registered with the Deeds Office or the Department of Surveyor General. Once the down payment is 
made, the purchaser is able to occupy the property and make improvements of a residential or agricultural 
nature. However, they cannot change the plot’s use without the consent of The Owners’ Association and 
the Local Authority.
A shift from individual to corporate ownership of land has been a dominant feature of agrarian structure in 
Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe at least since the 1980s, if not before. However, two characteristics 
distinguish the block scheme from the general trend of corporate land ownership. First, the Association or 
Company in the block scheme does not manage land use or the agricultural operations on behalf of its 
members; the members/shareholders for all intents and purposes are individual farmers. Second, the 
companies are comprised principally of indigenous black land farmers who would otherwise prefer owning 
their land outright but lacking this option have turned to a land holding company model that holds the land 
on their behalf. In the presence of inability to subdivide the land and secure individual land ownership, 
such an arrangement is more permanent and secure than subleasing arrangements particularly for 
residential stands. But without individual ownership or control of the assets of the company, the individual 
(lacking ability to mortgage his or her portion of the land) is left with insecure access to financial capital for 
improvements.
The original landowner receives revenue from the land sale as does the land developer who assists with 
forming the company and selling the lots, improved or otherwise. The company retains the title. By retaining 
the largest subdivision, the developer has leverage in controlling or influencing the decision making of the 
Association. However, it is the goal of most block scheme members/shareholders that, once established,
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the developer would eventually persuade the local planning department to formally subdivide the land and 
issue individual titles to the shareholders. Should this fail, the owner is at risk of the tenants objecting to 
future payments or wanting their money back.
The purchaser can immediately occupy the subdivision upon making the down payment. While the new 
member or landholder cannot further subdivide the land without consent of the Owners Association, 
shareholders, having completed their payment in full, are granted the right to sell their landholding to 
others within the scheme or to another willing buyer on the open market. In addition, the landholding can 
be sublet. But, the new members or shareholders also face a number of important challenges:
• Although the landholder engages in individual farming, she/he is unable to obtain mortgage credit 
or short term working capital from financial institutions for his or her individual farming operations 
using the land as collateral or security for the loan.
• Block schemes using company ownership remain untested in terms of secure property rights for 
the individual plot holders and their legal recourse.
• The scheme developer, by retaining a controlling interest in the company has leverage in decision 
making or control of the land holding company. Without adequate protection, the new landholders 
are at risk of having their land shares sold or compromised by unscrupulous land developers for 
land holding companies.
While, all the subdivisions are less than the stipulated maximum farm sizes for the agroecological region, 
satisfying current subdivision regulations will nonetheless be a challenge for most of the block schemes. 
Under the current land reform programme, the government is giving individuals between 6 and 15 hectares 
of arable land and about 20 hectares grazing land under the model A1, between 2-15 hectares for peri­
urban farmers, and 30-2000+ hectares for small, medium and large scale-farming units under the Model 
A2 commercial farming scheme. The land units being sold under the block share scheme would qualify in 
terms of size under the peri-urban scheme. However, they are too small for other model A2 and A1 
variants. Because the farms currently under the block share scheme are located in a rural agriculture 
zone, they contradict current land reform regulations. Since the area is zoned for rural agricultural use, 
local government will assess the subdivision in terms of economic viability which (according to local
Box 3: Case study of Railway and Kwabino Farms
The two properties (1 417 hectares combined) are located 14 kilometres west of Chegutu along the 
Chegutu-Kadoma highway. The block share scheme was implemented in September 2000 and is 
commonly referred to as Chegutu Country Village. All stands, 248 in total on the two properties, have 
been sold ranging in size from 3 to 8 hectares. The remainder (about 185 hectares), owned by the 
scheme developer, has most of the developments -  e.g. water, electricity and boreholes.
In setting up the scheme, a civil engineer was hired to design and supervise the implementation of all 
civil works including road construction and proposed plans for the homesteads. A surveyor carried out 
the land survey and produced the survey diagram. A town planner developed the subdivision layouts 
for the entire scheme. An agricultural consultant prepared a plan of potential agricultural activities to 
be undertaken by the new purchasers including production, infrastructure, markets, production costs 
and returns. The new landholders are free to choose their own agricultural activities and land use. 
However, approval of the Owner’s Association and the Local Authority is needed for any land use other 
than residential or agricultural. It is up to individual members or shareholders to make any connections 
to electricity and telephone networks. Each is also responsible for his or her own borehole(s) and 
sewage disposal through septic tanks.
The base price paid per undeveloped stand (other than access roads) was roughly 2$ 0.5 million for a 
10 hectare plot.17 Purchasers were required to either pay ..ash up front or make a 10 percent down 
payment with the balance due in equal (interest free) installments over a 5-10 year period. The purchaser 
could shorten the payment period by paying higher installments. Occupation can be as soon as the 
deposit is paid._________________________________________________continued on next page____
17 Actual prices varied according to proximity to urban centres and communication networks: production potential 
based on soil, topography and water resources: improvements on the land (e.g. dams, boreholes, electricity, 
farm buildings, roads and irrigation): and demand.
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The landholder or member, upon full payment of the purchase price, is issued with a share certificate 
and becomes a shareholder of the farm's holding company and a member of the owners’ association, 
which will be responsible for administering the scheme. The number of shares allocated to an individual 
depends largely on the size of the plot as a proportion of the whole property. The scheme developer 
maintains a significant portion of the land and voice in running the scheme.
For road upkeep, each plot holder is required to pay a levy to the scheme developer for road 
maintenance. Remaining improvements are the responsibility of the plot holder. Once one has paid 
the developer in full, he/she is free to sell their plot to other shareholders or to private individuals 
without notifying the scheme developer. One is also free to lease part or the whole of their plot to other 
individuals but the land use has to be agricultural. No other further subdivision is allowed without the 
approval of the Owner’s Association. Scheme participants also cannot use their share certificates as 
collateral to finance their own farm operations.
Maps demarcating individual plot holdings exist but are not registered with any government department 
or the Deeds Office as the developer has not yet lodged an application for subdivision permit with the 
Department of Physical Planning. The reason given by the developer is that the scheme must first be 
made operational with investments in infrastructure made before the Department will grant a subdivision. 
Unfortunately, as presently developed, the scheme would not likely pass the requirements for agricultural 
subdivision. The property in question is in an area zoned ’rural agricultural land’ where it is a requirement 
that any subdivisions created be economically viable for general agriculture. Water shortage is likely to 
be another problem; assuming that each unit has at least 2 boreholes, a serious depletion of the water 
table can be expected.
government officials) helps protect new farmers lacking adequate resources and technical know-how 
becoming engaged with specialized and diversified agriculture. The onus is therefore on the developer to 
provide the necessary infrastructure for intensive production before the subdivision is granted.
However, a more fundamental problem of block schemes is that they are surviving because the government 
has chosen not to impose sanctions on them based on provisions of the Regional, Town and Planning Act 
and the Rural Lands Act, No. 22 of 1976. According to this Act, a permit is required for “anything which 
might be an attempt to accomplish what amounts to a subdivision: an agreement for a change in ownership 
of any portion of a property; for a lease of any part for ten years or more or for a lifetime; a right to occupy 
for those periods; or for a renewal or a lease or right to occupy which take the period over ten years” 
(Bruce, 1990, p. 26). Block share schemes, by allowing occupation of portions of the farm to co-owners 
without a permit, violate this provision. Another piece of legislation which runs counter to the Block Share 
schemes is the Rural Lands Act (1979) which stipulates that land may not be sold or leased to two or more 
individuals jointly without the consent of the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. The 
Block Share schemes essentially involve transforming large individually owned land holdings into co­
owned properties. Section 10 of the Act also prohibits sharecropping without ministerial approval. Violations 
of these provisions attract criminal penalties including a two-year prison term (Section 11). These limitations 
on reallocation of land use rights prompted Bruce (1990) to conclude that “the sharecropping provision 
appears to have been intended to prevent de facto subdivision of large holdings among share-cropping 
black tenants” (p. 27).
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
It is not a question whether subdivision policy is needed for land use management and regulation, or for 
regulating peri-urban expansion. The answer is yes, but within reason! The more important question is 
whether Government will ever have the wherewithal to implement a subdivision policy with more acumen 
than it does at present, or whether government regulation can do a better job than the land market in 
supporting agricultural growth. Granted, environmental degradation and peri-urban settlements are a 
serious concern, as are problems of food security. But, it ought to be possible to decouple environmental 
degradation and land use planning from restrictions on the land market by simply imposing certain minimum 
restrictions on land use husbandry to protect soil, water and the environment.
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Such recommendations as annually changing maximum and minimum farm sizes in the national Land 
Policy Framework both grossly overestimate government’s capacity to implement policy, and seek to 
preserve a land bureaucracy that in it’s current form is a relic of the past. It is frequently complained that 
the subdivision criteria are out of date and not in keeping with modern farming practices where technology 
and skill prevail over plot size. Pegging subdivision approvals to archaic concepts such as “economic 
viability” and “full-time farming” ignore both the dynamics of modern day agriculture and the widespread 
prevalence of part-time farmers in rural Zimbabwe, and globally for that matter. How much should an 
individual or farming household earn? In today’s world of rapid technology growth, changing prices, 
competitive markets, part-time farming, and substitution possibilities of capital for land, the question is 
impossible to answer. The land administration machinery nonetheless in trying to control land sizes has 
constrained the ability of the land market to deliver land to formerly “disadvantaged” persons, and 
furthermore, is locking in land sizes that while seeming viable today will undoubtedly be wrong-sized 
tomorrow.
The current system is muddling along, driven by agencies that are too conservative to change, despite 
large cracks in the wall emerging. It is understandable that rigorous land sizes are enforced for urban and 
peri-urban residential and commercial development. However, it is far less clear why estates of 1000 
hectares or so in size must undergo the same scrutiny in terms of economic viability. What is perhaps 
most ironic is that a rigorous subdivision policy can be so strictly enforced to maintain notions of “agricultural 
viability”, while at the same time “fast track" resettlement since 2000 has resulted in massive transfer of 
land to smallholder beneficiary households who presently lack the means to sustainably use or develop 
the land resource. And, while the land bureaucracy puts on minimum farm size constraints to ensure the 
viability of economic (often large) farming units other sectors of government are imposing land ceilings to 
force redistribution. These and other contradictions only act to underscore what people have known for 
some time -  the current system of land administration (including subdivisions) is unworkable and is not 
serving the needs of agriculture, real estate development, or the needs of society at large. They in turn 
seek to overturn subdivision rejections in Administrative Courts clogging the legal machinery with claims, 
or stake out informal subdivisions to build a house or engage in agriculture on the basis of very tenuous 
legal rights.
Will there be a need for subdivisions after the Fast Track Land Reform Programme? There are strong 
arguments that this will be the case. Sizes of some A2 Scheme plots distributed, at greater than 250 
hectares, may need to be downsized in the future. There is also uncertainty about the status of those 
currently resettled under Fast Track Land Reform Programme given the high number of legal contestations 
involving land that has been distributed. There is a possibility therefore that some of the farms may revert 
to their original owners in their original large sizes. Even if the farmers are forced to downsize to the plot 
sizes stipulated under the Maximum Farm Size Regulations (1999), the farms will be large enough to 
warrant possible subdivision at future dates. Thus, subdivisions and subdivision regulations will be needed 
whatever the conclusion of the land reform exercise in Zimbabwe.
What might be done instead? Eliminate subdivision controls in all areas outside urban and peri-urban 
zones. Protect the environment and natural resource base through better monitoring and enforcement of 
environmental regulations, not through choice of beneficiaries or agrarian structure. Streamline subdivision 
procedures and requirements in urban and peri-urban areas, and focus government efforts on updating 
or upgrading obsolete master plans. Invest resources in private surveyors and ease surveying regulations 
to expand surveying services while lowering costs. Reform land legislation related to undivided shares, 
adopt new methods of group registration (condominium or group registration), and strengthen community 
based governance and group ownership models to obviate the need for minute subdivisions. Minute 
subdivision need not be the inevitable outcome of an unfettei . d land saies market, if a land rental market 
is supported that strengthens both rights of the lessor and iessee. Finally, ease subdivision procedures, 
processing time and fees, but only after the extent of subdivision policy has been limited in scope. While 
beneficiaries of land reform are always in need of stronger support services, in the area of subdivision 
policy, less not more, should be the mantra of the new land reform policy.
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